administrations, and this is good news for those who believe that a sophisticated technological infrastructure is needed to resolve difficult questions of tax design. 3 Technology-assisted fraud puts pressure on the development of marketplace controls; controls that certify the accuracy of business information. Some controls are in place today -more are on their way. Current solutions are both voluntary, 4 and mandatory. 5 Eventually we should expect to see comprehensive certification regimes that make all business systems transparent.
The technology-assisted frauds that tax administrations are responding to today not only involve large movements of goods that can involve publicly traded companiesmissing trader intra-community (MTIC, or carousel) fraud is an example in the EU 6 -they also involve technology-driven frauds in small and medium sized enterprises (SME). The most notable of the SME frauds is the use of technology to skim cash receipts at electronic cash registers (ECRs).
This paper focuses on two technology-accelerants of SME tax fraud -zappers and phantom-ware. Zappers and phantom-ware are in common use because they are difficult to detect, generate huge returns on minimal investment, and are widely available. They are widely available because very few jurisdictions restrict their manufacture, sale or distribution. In addition, zappers and instruction (technical assistance or help desk support) in the use of factory-installed phantom-ware translate into meaningful sales advantages for ECR manufacturers, distributors and installers. 7 Is it any wonder that we are seeing a global push-back by tax administrations? Is there any wonder that comprehensive certification regimes encompassing a company's entire tax-technology profile are being contemplated?
ZAPPERS & PHANTOM-WARE Zappers and phantom-ware are programs that are added-on (zappers) or factory installed (phantom-ware) to modern ECRs or point-of-sale (POS) systems. Some programs (zappers) have no legitimate purpose other than to facilitate cash skimming at the point-of-sale. Others programs (phantom-ware) may have legitimate (non-fraud) purposes, although these purposes are somewhat obscure (remote from normal business uses). Phantom-ware programs are frequently hidden (in the sense of not being disclosed in user manuals), making their use and even their existence difficult to detect on audit.
INDIRECT TAXES (Mar. 2008) (arguing that selective certification of businesses engaged in intra-community trade in sectors deemed to be susceptible to MTIC fraud would resolve this fraud more effectively than the wholesale redesign of the VAT currently under consideration as a possible solution); Commissioners of Customs & Excise and Attorney General v. Federation of Technological Industries and Others, Case C-384/04 (May 11, 2006) [2006] ECR I-04191 (responding to joint and several liability provisions that were seriously impacting legitimate chip suppliers, and holding that a taxable person, to whom a supply of goods or services has been made and who knew, or had reasonable grounds to suspect, that some or all of the value added tax payable in respect of that supply, or of any previous or subsequent supply, would go unpaid, may be made jointly and severally liable, with the person who is liable, for payment of that tax). 7 Perhaps the best analogy to zappers and phantom-ware is a Ferrari. A Ferrari provides far more than basic transportation; it provides speed. How fast can a Ferrari go? The WikiAnswer is 202 mph. See, WikiAnswer at: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_fast_can_a_Ferrari_F50_can_go]. Thus, even though it is illegal almost everywhere to drive at 202 mph there is an active (and legal) market for Ferraris. No government (other that the Indian State of Karnataka) requires that speed governors be installed on Ferraris as a condition of vehicle registration (and in Karnataka this requirement only applies to commercial registration).
The makers of zappers and phantom-ware see the world the same way. Just because a computer program has the potential to be used for fraud (just as a Ferrari has the potential to travel at 202 mph) should not make its manufacture, sale or distribution illegal, nor should it allow the government to step in and regulate the ECRs that contain them.
But what if the only thing a zapper or phantom-ware does is facilitate tax fraud? Does this make a difference with respect to their manufacture and possession? Additionally, does the fact that these programs obscure and delete records that pertain to funds that belong to the government from the beginning make a difference? Because businesses have fiduciary obligations with respect to the transaction taxes they collect, does this give the government the right to regulate the ECRs that record taxes paid by the consumer? Perhaps, collecting transaction taxes is more like driving a school bus than driving a Ferrari, and the governor may have a regulatory interest in controlling the "speed" of these programs.
With training a fraudster can skim cash receipts with phantom-ware as effectively as with a zapper.
Zappers are commonly temporary installations. A CD or memory stick containing a zapper is inserted into a POS system to reconstruct (delete, replace or supplement) ECR records from a network. Without a disclosure by the fraudster (or the distributor, or the zapper-developer) the use of a zapper is nearly impossible to detect. Traces of zapper use however, can be found when fraudsters are not careful. Occasionally back-up records remain in a POS system or an ECR that reference the original transaction data. For this reason, technical support is frequently needed when zappers are used, just as they are with phantom-ware applications -something that leads to long-term business-fraud relationships.
A further distinction between zappers and phantom-ware is helpful. A zapper is more likely to be placed on the server in a POS system (multiple ECRs linked in a network with one or more computers, printers and other data terminals), whereas phantom-ware frequently inhabits stand-alone ECRs.
Regardless of the type of programming involved, both zappers and phantom-ware facilitate the systematic skimming of cash receipts by deleting records of cash sales, renumbering receipts to disguise the deletion, and the production of conforming financial reports. In some cases these programs can be so thorough that they reach out beyond the ECR and the sale system itself to bring inventory and employee time records into line with the deletions.
The impact of a cash skimming fraud is felt throughout a revenue system. The most immediate losses are to consumption tax revenues (VAT or retail sales tax), but skimmed profits are also excluded from business taxes and not included in the personal income taxes of the owners (as distributions or dividends). The cash hoard from a successful skimming operation is almost always used to compensate employees under the table. Tax losses are further realized in the personal income tax of wage-earning employees as well as wage-indexed social security and medicare premiums. In some cases fraudsters structure above-the-table payments to allow employees to qualify for welfare assistance. 8 The range of technology-regulation being considered by governments in response to these frauds stretches from the development of a centralized data-base to collect and retain all records of all retail sales in a jurisdiction; 9 to mandatory government certification of each and every ECR in use in a jurisdiction; 10 to direct encryption by the government of the raw transactional data passing through an ECR or POS systemwithout regard for the background system that generates it -a solution that has seen both market-segment 11 and a whole-market 12 permutations; to voluntary third-party encryption and third-party certification of ECRs. 13 There are of course advocates for minimal regulation and traditional audit-enforcement, admittedly with significant enhanced technology training. The audit approach is most effective when there is authority to perform comprehensive audits -a simultaneous examination of all relevant taxes (income, consumption, and welfare levies). LJN: BC5500, at F3. Prior to using the phantom-ware installed on its system Dudok was skimming sales in a very amateur fashion. The entire sales records of the POS system were deleted and records were reconstructed on x-cell spreadsheets. The examining agents did not trust the spreadsheets and asked for the POS records as a back-up to confirm what they were being shown on the audit. This in turn lead to the conversation with Straight Systems BV where Dudok was informed that they already had phantom-ware that might solve this problem installed in their system. Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author). 18 Straight Systems BV is a Netherlands company that specializes in single-service ECR systems where all hardware and software are developed "in house." The company web site offers a 24-hour help desk where there is "… one point of contact for all hardware and software for checkout's front office and back office The defendant's cash register program includes various features to adjust the receipts later on. These possibilities are clearly described in the manual and are found easily in the menu structure of the program. If a receipt is adjusted using these functions, a "record" thereof is kept in the files so that any adjustments can be established afterwards. In addition [there is], a hidden option [that] exists to delete receipts. This function is not described in the manual and is also not included in the menu structure.
Moreover the retrieval of this option is very complicated and only possible if the defendant explained this to the buyer. Contrary to the other features, use of this hidden option does not leave any traces in the files that are written to the disk. As a result, it is impossible at a later date to establish that the receipts have been deleted, hence this can, in principle, not be checked. It is self-evident that completely removing receipts from the books is a pre-eminent means for hiding turnover from the Internal Revenue Service.
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This is a description of the essential characteristics of a phantom-ware system. It is an operating system designed for an ECR that for all practical purposes is fully transparent. All traditional programming options are explained in detail in the user's manual, all traditional options are visible in the menu structure and the use of any of these options leaves a clear audit trail for both the owner and external auditors. However, transparency is apparent, not real. Embedded in the operating system is functionality that selectively eliminates sales records without leaving an audit trail. Knowledge of this functionality is passed secretly (almost always orally) from the ECR provider to the ECR user.
The appeals court in LJN: AX6802 reacts strongly to the following facts -the "hidden design" of the programming -the transmission of "secret knowledge" about its existence -the "secret instruction" that is provided in its operation:
In view of the special characteristics of the hidden option and the existence of the program's other features for making adjustments, the court cannot imagine any other purpose for the hidden option than the illegal manipulation of turnover figures. The court is therefore firmly convinced that the defendant, as the seller, was aware of this. By selling to delete the whole ticket. If an affirmative response is given then the system records a "no sale" and the entire audit trail to the original data is eliminated. Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author). 20 The trial court in Rotterdam refers to the phantom-ware application as a "hidden delete function" whereas the appeals court in The Hague refers to the phantom-ware as "the erase rule." 21 LJN: BC5500, at F3. 22 Id.
this software to a catering establishment, the defendant knowingly and willfully accepts the considerable chance that the buyer will use the program to delete turnover to conceal it from the Internal Revenue Service, with all associated tax consequences. …In view of the context within with the delete option was discussed [between the managing director of Straight Systems BV and the owner-manager of Dudok], the court assumes that the managing director of the defendant, and hence the defendant, knew that [Dudok] wanted to dupe the Internal Revenue Service.
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It is particularly troubling to the appeals court that not only is, "[t]his erase rule actually made available to various customers, [but that the] defendant also offered support to customers -also in respect of this erase rule -by means of a helpdesk. Viewed against this background, making the erase rule available is part of the normal conduct of the business of the defendant."
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Saying that these practices are "part of the normal conduct of the business" of Straight Systems BV is tantamount to saying that this fraud is a cancerous mutation that goes well beyond the traditional fraud where cash receipts are skimmed through a two-till system. This is a fraud that has entered the bloodstream of the market-place. As a result, the government needs to consider market-level as opposed to single-business-enterpriselevel responses.
The ECR/POS system market-place. How dynamic, how diverse, and how competitive is the market-place within which ECR/POS systems are bought and sold? If regulation is imposed, how responsive would the market be to this regulation?
Answers will differ from country, but a relatively accurate assessment can be made based on the data from jurisdictions that regulate already -jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory certification regimes for ECR/POS systems. The figures for Greece were relied upon in the Cash Register Good Practice Guide to paint this picture, but similar figures can be produced in with the records kept by any of the other "fiscal memory" 25 (or "fiscal till") jurisdiction. 26 These jurisdictions require all entrepreneurs to use only certified tills, and further obligate each of them to secure the memory of their machines for tax audit purposes.
There are about 10 million people in Greece, and approximately 800,000 SMEs. These SMEs operate roughly 300,000 to 350,000 ECRs and POS systems. There is a 23 Id. 24 LJN: BC5500, at F4. 25 The Cash Register Good Practice Guide, supra note 5, Appendix D, at 1 indicates:
Fiscal memory is where cash register transactions are permanently recorded. This memory is sealed and may only be accessed by authorized personnel or tax audit officials. Retail businesses cannot trade unless they have an approved cash register, which is subject to inspection and certification by tax authorities 26 Other "fiscal memory" jurisdictions include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Hungary Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela. Id., at 1. sizeable turnover in ECR/ POS systems each year -somewhere between 30,000 to 40,000 systems are replaced annually. Competing for this turnover business are approximately 50 importers or manufacturers, and together they offer in excess of 300 different fiscal machines. The major players in this market are from Germany and Italy, but there are also a significant numbers of non-EU sellers with American, Japanese and Chinese providers being the most significant.
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No manufacturer dominates the market; no systems dominate the market. With a healthy range of providers and product, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ECR/POS system market-place in Greece remains robust even though fiscal regulation has been in place since 1988. If the "fiscal memory" regulation has not adversely impacted the market, it has adversely impacted phantom-ware applications in Greek ECRs. Certification appears to have both eliminated phantom-ware fraud and leveled the playing field in the ECR/POS system market-place. Things are very different in nonfiscal memory jurisdictions. Technological-assistance for cash skimming fraud is a selling-point in these markets. As the Greek official referenced above indicates:
Cash Register producers … don't make their models with identical functions. They make their machines according to market "requirements." They know for example that in UK there is no specific legislation or other tech specs or approval requirements for cash registers. Furthermore, it is widely known that there is no chance for a producer to sell his models in a "non-fiscal" country (like UK) if these models don't have (less or more) built-in hidden capabilities and thus to facilitate the owner-user to manipulate stored data and cause confusion to auditors.
On the other hand, every model which is going to be sold in the territory of a "fiscal country" (like Greece, Italy, Poland, Hungary, etc.) must be approved and licensed. Thus, it has to be compliant with the specific national legislation regarding cash registers. This means that the producer must make its model compliant with the specific national legislation regarding cash registers. [ECR manufacturers] … will never apply for exactly the same model being sold in UK to be licensed in Greece or Hungary. [They know] … (or must have been informed) about the specific Greek … requirements and will make the appropriate changes and proper conformations (adjustments) to the firmware and/or to the hardware of the given model. Competition in the unregulated market-place (the "non-fiscal" countries) puts exceptional pressure on sales personnel looking for an advantage to make a deal. This clearly motivated Straight Systems BV in the Dutch cases considered above. The unlevel playing field has becomes a breeding ground for phantom-ware and zappers in the Netherlands. This is not to say that honest sales people are not present in the market-place. Some individuals and companies simply refuse to violate ethical principles just to make a sale. This appears to be what was behind a reported call into the Connecticut Department of Revenue.
My only recent instance that involved a "zapper" like product was an anonymous call my office received from someone in the cash register business looking for information on filing a complaint against a competitor. Apparently the caller was attempting to make a sale at a restaurant and was informed that another company attempting to secure the same sale had offered to install such a program in the register if he/she was given the sale. The caller did not elaborate as to who the other salesperson was employed by or any specifics about the workings of the program.
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"SELF-HELP" PHANTOM-WARE There is a kind of "poor man's" phantom-ware that is widely available on almost all major ECR/POS systems, but it requires a bit of technical expertise and considerable care to carry out effectively. The selling point of the Finishing Touch system (particularly the "Tickview.exe" functionality) was that this kind of "self-help" was fully automated.
It is important to recognize that all phantom-ware applications need not be "hidden programming" embedded in the ECR/POS system as in the Dudok/Straight Systems cases -dedicated programming that is designed only to manipulate sales. Phantom-ware outcomes can be achieved by knowledgeable operators working with legitimate programming options commonly (although occasionally "obscurely") available on modern ECRs. The problem for the fraudster using "self-help" phantom-ware options is that mistakes are common, and their use can be detected through careful till interrogation.
CASIO TE-2000 ECR -refunds omitted from the daily sales reports. The following example of "self-help" phantom-ware application is set out in the Cash Register Good Practice Guide. The Guide indicates:
Owing to the massive range of standard programming options incorporated into modern ECR's and POS systems, no guarantee can therefore be given that sales information contained in Z reports is reliable and complete. In the following discussion some familiarity is assumed with Z Reports ("daily" and" periodic," normally called Z1 and Z2), 32 X Reports ("daily" and" periodic," normally called X1 and X2) 33 and Electronic Journal Reports. 34 The example (one of many possible) set out in the Guide concerns a "self-help" sales suppression technique that allows skimming through refunds and the suppression of these amounts from Z Reports (the so called "non-resettable grand sales totals).
In the CASIO TE-2000 the program that controls printing on Z Reports is READ/RESET REPORT PRINTING CONTROL, PROGRAM 0822. The procedure for reading (printing) the program is:
(1) select PGM mode (the program mode switch); (2) press 3 (3) press SUB TOTAL (4) press SUB TOTAL When the program prints the setting information will be listed on the top of the report. It should indicate: "Program 0822, command code 00001000." [Note: the program setting is 001000, however the program reading is an eight digit number, thus there is a prefix of "00" added. The prefix is not material to this discussion.] The following table breaks down the program code:
31 See supra note 5, Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix E, at 4.1.1. 32 One of the most important functions of a cash register is to record sales, taxes collected, media totals, discount, voids, and more. The report printed at the end of day or shift that reports this information and resets it for the next day or shift is known as the "Z" report. The "Z" report function prints the sales on the cash register tape while erasing the data from the memory. A "Z" is a once only report for a set period of time. Many Cash Register have "Z2" feature that allows "Z" reports to be added together. When an operator "Z2's them out" they will erase these reports for a longer period of time. An example of a "Z2" report is a monthly report that will be used to date and record monthly cash register sales. Every time the register is "Z'd out" (Report taken) that total is erased from the daily sales files and added to the "Z2" file. 33 "X" reports are the identical in information and time span to the "Z" reports. "X" reports only provide reports, they do not reset, or clear the memory. "X" reports can be taken as often as needed with no effect on sales data recorded. 34 See supra note 5, Cash Register Good Practice Guide, Appendix G, at 1.2. The electronic journal usually contains ALL transactions keyed into the more complex types of till systems and is therefore the definitive record to obtain for audit purposes. There are exceptions, where Electronic Journals can be programmed "not-to-store" certain keying transactions e.g. "Training Mode." The Electronic Journal should not be confused with the "Z" tape as it is not a recap of the day's sales. The Electronic Journal tape is supposed to be a "blow-by-blow" record of every transaction made "step-bystep." It is most useful for going back during a day to look for mistakes that were made. This journal has been a staple in the cash register industry since its conception. It can be used to check the Z report.
"D" = digit
To reconfigure the 0822 program in the CASIO TE-2000 the following steps are taken:
(1) select PGM mode (2) press 3 (3) press SUB TOTAL (4) press the program that needs to be reconfigured (i.e. 0822) on the numeric keyboard. (5) press SUB TOTAL (6) press the new program code (we are changing code 001000 to 003100) (7) press the CA/AMT TEND key (8) press SUB TOTAL Some explanation is needed on what the code at item (6) means initially and then how the new code is derived. The previous code 001000 is interpreted as follows:
(a) D6 set to "0" indicates "print first and last consecutive numbers of the day." (b) D5 set to "0" indicates three things: a. "skip zero total lines on department and transaction read/reset report" b. "skip zero total lines on PLU read/reset report" c. "skip zero total lines on hourly sales report." (c) D4 set to "1" indicates two things:
a. "print the sales ratio on read/reset report" b. "do not suppress printing of the non-resettable grand total on the daily reports." (d) D3 set to "0" indicates two things:
a. "suppress the printing of RF [refund] totals and RF count [both RF mode and RF key]" b. "print tax rate with tax totalizer." (e) D2 and D1 signify actions that are not relevant in this discussion
The new code "003100" changes the values at items D4 and D3. D4 is changed from "1" to "3." D4 makes two statements. The first statement, "print the sales ratio read/reset report," has a value of "0" for "no" and "1" for "yes," and we want this statement to read "yes." The second statement, "do not suppress printing of the nonresettable grand total on the daily reports," has a value of "0" for "no" and "2" for "yes," and we want this statement to also read "yes." Thus, D4 needs to be "3" (or, 1 + 2 = 3). We are trying to suppress printing of the non-resettable grand total on the daily reports, so to do this we need to change D4 from "1" to "3." D3 deals specifically with the refund (RF) function, and we need to change this value from "0" to "1." D3 makes two statements. The first statement, "suppress the printing of RF [refund] totals and RF count [both RF mode and RF key]" has a value of "0" for "no" and a value of "1" for "yes," and we want to suppress the printing of the refunds, so this value needs to be "1." The second statement, "print tax rate with tax totalizer," has a value of "0" for "no" and "2" for "yes." We do not need the tax rates to be printed, so the default setting of "0" is fine. Thus, D3 needs to be "1" (or 1 + 0 = 1) instead of "0."
Our goal is to suppress the printing of RF totals and RF count, and suppress the printing of the non-resettable grand total on the daily reports. The code to do this is "003100" -as shown in the following table:
Once re-programmed, "[t]he daily read/reset reports printed in X and Z modes will not print the non-resettable grand total and refund transactions made in the RF mode and RF key." 35 The Guide runs two examples based on this re-programming. The first (using the "001000" code) shows:
• sales of 1,000 (500 + 250 + 250),
• a refund of 250, and
• a cash-in-the-drawer total of 750. The second (using the "003100" code) shows:
• sales of 750 (250 + 250 + 250),
• no refund, and • a cash-in-the-drawer total of 750.
If in fact sales of 1,000 were made, and the business owner skimmed 250 from the ECR and rung this "skim" through the cash register as a refund, neither the Z Report (Z1 or Z2), nor the X Report (X1 or X2) would show it. Both the consumption tax on the sale (VAT or RST) and the income on the sale could easily go unreported. An audit that checked tax returns against the Z Report, even if cross-checked with the X Report would not detect the fraud.
The flaw in this particular fraud is that the refunds could show up in the Electronic Journal (that is of course if additional programming options are not selected to eliminate the printing of refunds in the Electronic Journal.) 36 Much the same fraud can be accomplished by recording live sales in the training mode. Training mode sales can be eliminated from Z and X Reports as well as the Electronic Journal.
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Reliance on the Electronic Journal in a CASIO TE-2000 is not a "fail-safe" check for tax auditors. There are significant problems with the completeness and correctness of the data in the Electronic Journal. The Dutch Tax Administration has examined more advanced CASIO systems, the CASIO QT-6000 and CASIO TE-4000, and is convinced that Electronic Journals in even these machines are not secure. The main risk (in all CASIO machines) is that the RAM on which the data are preserved is too small and there is no mechanism to store data on an external medium. As a result, when the RAM is full, data is simply over-written. The only way to access (and preserve) the Electronic Journal data on a CASIO machine is to use the back office program CASIO Hospitality, but on this medium also there is no assurance of completeness and correctness of the data. 38 Effectively, CASIO machines cannot be relied upon to preserve business records. They can be programmed to delete records on the Z Reports and the X Reports, and can be relied upon to delete data in the Electronic Journal automatically (after certain volume limits are reached).
ZAPPERS
Zapper technology takes the fraud of skimming cash sales to new levels of sophistication. Zappers need to be seen from the perspective of the market-place that has produced them. Zappers respond to the inherent risk of detection in phantom-ware applications. Because phantom-ware is embedded in the same ECR/POS system that is the subject of the tax audit, there is always a risk that a careful till interrogation will uncover how the fraud is accomplished.
Zappers minimize this risk. Zappers are physically kept apart from the ECR/POS system they manipulate. Zappers are kept on cassettes, 39 CDs, or memory sticks. 40 They are inserted temporarily into the ECR/POS system to perform sales manipulations. When the procedure is completed, the zapper is removed. If a zapper is well developedif it is designed by someone with detailed knowledge of the operating code it is being used on -then no trace of the original data trail will remain. Everything will be rewritten, and the program that did it will be gone.
The pressures that breed the zappers. The wide use of zapper technology in a particular jurisdiction seems to be a function of (or, a response to) the convergence of three significant technological, legal and market pressures: (1) a street-level awareness that there is technological available to quickly, cheaply, and invisibly skim cash sales; (2) the awareness that criminal sanctions and aggressive enforcement actions are being directed at phantom-ware suppliers (the ECR/POS systems suppliers whose systems include phantom-ware); and (3) the pressure that ECR/POS system distributors and sales personnel feel to perform (to make sales) in a highly competitive commercial market. Wherever these three pressures are elevated zappers flourish.
Technical capacity. Skimming cash receipts from the till of a SME is a very old tax fraud. If conducted on a small scale it is very difficult to detect. However, on a large scale cash skimming inevitably leads to a double set of books, one for the auditor and the other for running the business. While it is possible to skim large sums with a simple double till system (as in the UK Aleef Garage Ltd. case), 41 it soon becomes apparent to the fraudsters that technology will reduce the likelihood of detection by simply making the recordkeeping much easier (as in the Australian Ronen 42 case). 43 Technology's attraction is that it makes the same fraud much less visible. If detection is a concern and if simplicity is an objective, then a zapper is much preferred over phantom-ware because a zapper can be physically hidden and it requires no re-programming of software (as long as the base technology of the ECR/POS system does not change).
The Ronen case illuminates the pressure of technological capacity very well. It is abundantly clear from this case that the Ronens were concerned that the manual skimming operation they had developed would be detected as the Australian GST came in. It is also clear (in retrospect) that their fears were misplaced. The court noted that the Ronen skimming would not have been uncovered through a standard audit, because this "… conspiracy came to light only by chance. It appears, as a result of telephone intercepts being placed on another person's telephone service, that the Ronens' involvement in the distribution of large amounts of money from Australia to overseas locations was detected [and it was only by following this lead was the skimming technology uncovered]." 44 However, for this analysis the important point to understand is the motivationthe reason for making the decision to move into technology to skim cash sales. In Ronen this decision was largely controlled by perceptions -the perception that there was an increased risk of detection in a GST audit, and the perception that technology (specifically a custom-made zapper) offered the best shelter from detection.
In other words, once it becomes widely known in the market-place that the technology to easily skim sales is readily available fraudsters are drawn to it.
Criminal sanctions. When jurisdictions aggressively pursue developers of fraudfacilitating technology with financial penalties and criminal sanctions the technology does not go away -it morphs into technology that (a) does not remain within the user's hardware, and (b) is provided by intermediaries, not the ECR/POS system manufacturer.
Developer-focused criminal enforcement activity is on the rise in the Netherlands. LJN: AX6802 and the appeal LJN: BC5500 both focused on the Straight Systems BV (the developer of the phantom-ware option in the Finishing Touch system) more so than the Grande Café Dudok (the user of the system). In B&F Optics the phantom-ware was not pre-installed (as with the Finishing Touch software) , but was installed by the manufacturer, "on request of the taxpayer." 47 But after installation it remained on the customer's ECR. The software, … was quite sophisticated. The hairdresser would enter a percentage that he wanted to be skimmed. Importantly, the thoroughness of the B&F Optics investigation, the visits to "hundreds of hairdressers" was prompted by the desire to build a criminal case not just against the users, but against the software company, and its "de facto" director, Hein van de Weijer.
A further variant can be found in LJN: AT5876, a case dealing with phantomware placed in the weighing scales of shopkeepers selling fresh produce. The software program (called Analysis), "… allowed the reduction of daily turnover to as little as 49%." 49 The local news accounts provide more details on the scope of the criminal investigation into the developer:
Managing director R. Velema of the software company Micro Craft confesses to the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service ('FIOD') that he developed a module for weighing scales allowing shopkeepers selling fresh produce to manipulate their sales figures. According to his lawyer … the managing director acted on the instruction of two large suppliers of computer-controlled weighing scales. … Dozens of greengrocers, butchers, fish dealers, poulterers throughout the country were raided as well. In the next months, some 800 fellow shopkeepers can expect a visit from the FIOD-officers. The FIOD suspects that shopkeepers cook their books on a large scale using the special Langlaufmodule allowing the amounts of the cash register weighing systems to be changed at a later time. The so-called creaming-off module makes it possible to enter completely different sales figures in the books, as a result of which the Internal Revenue Service misses out an a tremendous amount of tax revenues. … Micro Craft supplied over 400 Langlauf-modules to shopkeepers throughout the country. Moreover, a weighing scale [company] apparently also supplied hundreds of copies.
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Once again the installed phantom-ware (this time installed on weighing scales that are connected to ECRs, not on the ECR itself) is found in multiple businesses (over 1,200) but the focus of the criminal investigation is against the software developer.
However, LJN: AT5876 is a good example of how this fraud is morphing as tax administrations pursue it. In this case not only is the phantom-ware not placed in the ECR, but it is developed by a computer specialist who did not directly benefiting from its sale.
"My client spent three days in custody", said the criminal lawyer. "He has put all his cards on the table. In his module, he had built in a functionality that could be used to commit fraud. He did not do this with criminal intent. He was bound to two large suppliers he could not refuse. When he found out three years ago that it was extensively abused, he stopped the supplies. He did not earn a penny with it, either. He was simply naive."
51
It is only a short step from these phantom-ware cases to the real zappers that are designed and distributed by individuals not associated with the hardware they are used on, and that are physically removed after they manipulate sales figures. An example of the difficulties that a zapper can cause a tax administration can be seen in the Swedish case that is expected to go to court this summer.
The cash register (hardware) that was used to skim cash sales in a restaurant under audit is a TT PI Electronique. 52 This cash register is a popular restaurant model in significant use in Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Australia, the U.S.A. and North Africa. The software program operating the suspect cash register is called Restodata. "According to the exe-file the program was produced by a company called 'Restodata Inc.' However, we haven't been able to find that name anywhere."
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The Restodata program comes with a "… grey program dongle on a memorystick, [and another] … silver memory-stick [the zapper]." 54 The difficulty the Swedish tax administration is having with this investigation is precisely the difference between phantom-ware and zappers -once the zapper is found, its trail leads only back to the single restaurant where it was found. In other words, all TT PI Electronique cash registers are not necessarily suspect. This is a very different fact pattern from the restaurants that used Finishing Touch cash registers, or the hairdressers that used B&F Optics machines, or the over 400 greengrocers that used Micro Craft Langlauf-modules.
Highly competitive markets. Using the Greek data as a base-line -a country of 10 million people with 800,000 SME's operating roughly 300,000 to 350,000 ECRs or POS systems from 50 different importers and manufacturers from within and without the EUthere is clearly competition in the ECR market-place. Competition is intense for the replacement/ upgrade business as 30,000 to 40,000 systems turnover annually.
55 Similar market profiles can be drawn globally.
If this market is dissected carefully at its core are another set of SMEs -the ECR/ POS system distributors and installers. Both of these entrepreneurial groups work significantly on a commission basis that is contingent on the sale of new ECRs or POS systems. They stand between the user and the manufacturer.
If there is a heightened street-level demand for skimming technology, and if an elevated threat of criminal sanctions creates unacceptable risk levels for major manufacturers to get involved, 56 then there is a vacuum created that can be filled by middlemen. It seems clear in many jurisdictions that these agents are filling the void, providing (designing, distributing, and providing tech support for) the next generation skimming technology -the zapper.
Logicaisse Ltd. On March 12, 2008 Revenue Quebec executed eight search warrants in Laval, Montreal, Mascouche, and Chateauguay. The object of the warrants was Logicaisse Ltd., one of Quebec's largest cash register specialists, 57 a company that sells, rents, and provides maintenance for cash registers. The press release indicated:
Revenue Quebec has reasonable grounds to believe the company has developed and distributed a zapper … software used with RMS-Touch, 56 Only one case has been found where a major manufacturer of an ECR/ POS system has developed and distributed a zapper -AMG Corporation's "Quanto" produced to defeat its own certified software (Robot) uncovered by the Operation Internet by the State Tax Administration of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Even cases like LJN: AX6802 and LNJ: BC5500involving the factory installed phantom-ware in the Finishing Touch ECRs are not common, although the self-help kinds of phantom-ware continue to be available on major ECR systems. The careful re-programming requirements for self-help phantom-ware presents barriers to user adoption, but also shelters the manufacturer that provides these options, because there are commonly more than one good(non-fraud-facilitating) reason for having these options available.
Operation Internet was conducted by the State Tax Administration of Minas Gerais (a Brazilian State in the Southeast region -close to Rio and São Paulo). The AMG corporation produced not only government certified software (Robot) for cash registers operating in the state; it produced the Zapper (Quanto) that defeated it:
Three partners and a clerk at the AGM Consultancy and Systems Corporation, Ltd., based out of Juiz de Fora, were arrested yesterday, accused of developing a software program for dodging taxes. The company had been under investigation for three months prior to this, and in the State Revenue Secretary's estimation the program, which does not tally sales as required by law and produces no receipts, thus allowing for the monitoring of financial activity through unofficial accountancy, may be in use by at least 150 commercial establishments in the city.
All the financial activity recorded by this program was stored on a still unidentified, Internet based network server. The Revenue Department admits however that corporations based in other Zona da Mata-area cities, and even in Rio de Janeiro, may be using the same software.
…Preliminary evaluations indicate that these corporations illegally withheld between 40% and 50% of taxes owed…. AGM was licensed by the State Revenue department to develop programs to perform accountancy functions for commercial establishments. They supplied customers with the official program, called "Robot," along with the illegal program "Quanto," which allowed sales to be effectuated without the issuing of receipts, with a mere press of a button on the cash register.
"With this function the establishment's owner would be able to simply choose when he wanted to have legal accountancy performed, and when he wanted to illegally withhold taxes," said Luiz Pedri, regional superintendent of the Revenue department. [of] which it is the exclusive distributor in Quebec, [and] which has enabled different companies, mostly restaurants, to use zappers to conceal sales in order to avoid payment of taxes. 58 RMS-Touch is a privately owned American company, located in Fort Lee New Jersey about a mile north of the George Washington Bridge. An IBM Business Partner and an NCR Solution Provider it is known as the pioneer in restaurant Point Of Sale systems (POS), introducing in 1987 the first non proprietary, PC based restaurant touch screen Point Of Sale system. It is a leader in restaurant, bar and supermarket systems. 59 It appears that Revenue Quebec believes that Logicaisse Ltd. has married its position as the exclusive distributor of: (1) CRS, Samsung and Sharp cash registers (hardware) with (2) its exclusive distribution rights in RMS-Touch (software), and (3) a zapper that it developed on its own, but that works in conjunction with the RMS-Touch system. Logicaisse Ltd. therefore would be classic middleman responding to a streetlevel demand for fraud-facilitating technology with a zapper added to third-party products for which it holds the exclusive distribution rights. This may be in part the reason it has been the number one distributor of Samsung products in the world since 1998.
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Audio Lab Inc. A similar investigation by Revenue Quebec several years earlier gives some idea of the time commitment needed in a zapper investigation where the objective is to target the developer (as much, if not more than individual users). On April 8, 2004 Revenue Quebec announced that it executed four search warrants on the numbered company 9061-1184 Quebec Inc. which operated a restaurant under the name San Antonio Grill in Laval, Quebec. The allegation was that a "sales zapper" (camoufleur de ventes) was used to delete sales records. The zapper was on a diskette. 61 The next year, on April 25, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that the director of San Antonio Grill pleaded guilty to using a zapper, 62 and a related company of similar name, Grill San Antonio in Repentigny, also pleaded guilty to similar offences. 63 Later the same year, on October 1, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that it executed five more search warrants in Montreal and Laval with respect to Audio Lab LP, Inc. This company was under suspicion of having developed and marketing a zapper that worked with Softdine, a restaurant cash register software that it also manufactured. 64 Softdine was the operating software in the cash registers at San Antonio's Grill in Laval, and at Grill San Antonio in Repentigny.
On June 26, 2007 (more than three years after execution of the initial search warrants in this case) Audio Lab LP, Inc. pleaded guilty to charges of having, "… designed and marketed a computer program designed to alter, amend, delete, cancel or otherwise alter accounting data in sales records kept by means of a software that [Audio Lab LP] had designed and marketed." Press reports directly link this conviction to the investigation begun at Grill San Antonio in Laval in 2004. 65 Mr. Michel Roy. Another investigation by Revenue Quebec shows how zapper development and installation morphed into a cottage industry for close family members who were software developers and installers. This investigation involved twenty-eight restaurants doing business under the name Stratos. Each of the restaurants in the Stratos chain used a zapper.
To dispose of the excess cash from skimmed sales (1) a double billing system was put in place with suppliers (to conceal purchases made in cash), and (2) wages were paid to employees in cash (without being reported as income). The guilty pleas from this investigation came in waves -nineteen companies pleading guilty on September 26, 2002; another six pleading guilty on October 11, 2002, and the four remaining pleading guilty on March 21, 2003.
Press releases provide details of only the final ten companies. In aggregate the taxes and penalties for these companies came to $1,816,070.90, but the real thrust of the news releases was that "… the Department has conducted searches in order to establish proof that the designer of the IT function associated with the cash register software Terminal Resto had participated in the scheme set up by restaurants in the Stratos chain." 66 
